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ON NPES, HOLDUPS, AND UNDERLYING FAULTS 
IN THE PATENT SYSTEM 
David S. Olson† 
This piece offers commentary on two essays in the current 
volume of the Cornell Law Review: James Bessen and Michael J. 
Meurer’s The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes and David L. Schwartz and 
Jay P. Kesan’s Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent 
System.  Schwartz and Kesan’s essay critiques Bessen and Meurer and 
offers some further thoughts on the role of empirical work regarding 
non-practicing entities (NPEs).1  Before I begin my substantive 
comments on the two pieces, I must say that these two essays, which 
engage each other fulsomely, carefully, and respectfully, are models 
of how academic debate should be conducted.  They provide great 
value to the reader in their thoughtful responses to each other’s 
arguments.  The pieces are each individually made more useful to the 
reader concerned about patent policy because they take opposing 
positions on a number of issues but do so in a way that illuminates 
both commonalities and differences in their analyses and arguments.  
This type of policy debate is exactly what the numerous policy 
disputes and empirical questions in patent law need. 
All of the authors of the two essays agree that there has been very 
rapid growth in NPE patent assertion in recent years.2  New business 
models have arisen in which entities unrelated to the original 
inventors acquire large portfolios of patents, or the rights to assert 
large numbers of patents, and then seek to monetize these patents 
through licensing and litigation rather than commercialization.3  
Some amount of asserting patents that were never commercialized 
has always occurred,4 but the extent of activity and patent holdings of 
NPEs is a new phenomenon.  Thus, some potential costs of patents 
 
 † Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  I thank Sarandos Markopoulos 
and David Hackett for able research assistance. 
 1 NPEs are entities that hold and assert patents but do not make the inventions for 
which they have the patents.  See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from 
NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 390 (2014).  There is considerable debate about 
who should be called an NPE.  See id. at 396.   
 2 See id. at 390–91; David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014).   
 3 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2, at 429.   
 4 See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 390 (noting the presence of “patent 
sharks” as early as the nineteenth century).   
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that the patent system adapted to minimize or control have grown 
greatly under this new dynamic.  The most remarked-upon difference 
is that in the past, competitors with large patent portfolios rarely 
asserted them against each other, for fear of retaliation in the form of 
getting sued on patents in their competitors’ portfolios.5  There is no 
counterbalancing concern on the part of NPEs about being sued by 
those against whom they assert patents.6  What this means is that 
problems with patent quality, overbroad claims, defects in notice 
function, and possible patent thickets were minimized in the past but 
have become much more apparent and problematic now that NPEs 
are doing a significant amount of patent assertion.  It is this change 
in the patent ecosystem, coupled with the consequent costs that the 
change is imposing on those who are commercializing innovations 
arguably covered by patents owned by NPEs, that have generated 
significant attention, complaints, and calls for reform in the last 
several years. 
Over the last few years, Bessen and Meurer have been attempting 
to quantify the cost to the patent system from assertion of patents by 
NPEs.  In their latest empirical study, they use two new data sources 
to estimate these costs, and they arrive at results that are broadly 
consistent with their past analyses.7  Their conclusion remains that 
patent assertions by NPEs are very costly to the patent system and are 
a source of considerable social waste that is the reasonable subject of 
reform efforts.8 
In their critique, Schwartz and Kesan take issue with Bessen and 
Meurer’s results, methodology, sources, and conclusions.  Rather 
than jumping directly into the dispute, I think it is useful to examine 
some of the underlying policy issues and assumptions that are at play 
in these two essays. 
Bessen and Meurer contend that the data show that NPE patent 
assertion resulted in direct costs to defendants of $29 billion in 2011.9  
These costs include the costs to defendants of outside legal fees, 
discovery, prior art searching, jury consultants, and all other outside 
legal costs.10  Schwartz and Kesan dispute this, arguing that, mainly 
because of selection bias in who is reporting costs, the $29 billion 
figure is an upper limit to the costs, and that the actual costs may be 
 
 5 Colleen Chien, A Race to the Bottom, 51 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAGAZINE 10 (2012). 
 6 See Brad D. Krueger, Pulling Trolls Out from Under the Bridge: Proposed Patent Reforms, 
GERMESHAUSEN CTR. NEWSLETTER (Franklin Pierce L. Ctr., Concord, N.H.), 
Winter/Spring 2005, at 4; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION & PATENT LAW & POLICY chs. 2, 31 (2003). 
 7 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 389, 394–95.   
 8 See id. at 422–23.   
 9 Id. at 397, 408. 
 10 All in-house legal costs were excluded from the data.  Id. at 399 n.59. 
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significantly less.11  While Schwartz and Kesan’s critique is fair, the 
reader should keep in mind that the full costs to defendants may 
have been more than $29 billion in 2011, given that Bessen and 
Meurer do not include the internal costs to defendants dealing with 
NPE patent assertions.  These can be considerable in terms of both 
time and money.12 
Bessen and Meurer also conclude that only 5%–20% of the 
direct costs from NPE patent assertions ever reach inventors.13  Their 
analysis of the data shows that almost half of the direct costs to 
defendants of NPE patent assertions “are eaten up by NPE operating 
costs, and [that] another 10%” of the costs go to NPE profits.14  
Schwartz and Kesan dispute the analysis.  They point out that some of 
the entities classified as NPEs, like Interdigital and Rambus, originally 
made large investments in research and development in attempting 
to commercialize their patents.15  Thus, according to Schwartz and 
Kesan, some of the profit NPEs earn from current payments from 
patent assertions should be thought of as compensation for early 
R&D investments.  According to this way of thinking, much more of 
the NPE patent assertion revenue actually goes to compensate or 
encourage R&D.16 
I will largely leave to the two essays the arguments over who has 
the better interpretation of the data, the reliability of the data, 
selection bias, and the best empirical approaches to analyze NPE 
assertion activity.  As I have already said, the essays do an excellent 
job of setting out their arguments in these regards.  They also do an 
excellent job of responding to each other’s critiques. 
What is important to realize is that underlying the dispute over 
the total direct cost of NPE patent assertion is a more fundamental 
problem with patent assertion by both NPEs and practicing entities—
namely, that most of the patents being asserted were never copied or 
even known about by the defendants being accused of 
infringement.17  Schwartz and Kesan argue that the total cost of NPE 
patent assertion is probably substantially lower than the 2011 estimate 
of $29 billion given by Bessen and Meurer.  Schwartz and Kesan also 
believe that a greater percentage of the costs to defendants end up 
 
 11 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2, at 433.   
 12 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 389–90. 
 13 See id. at 411.   
 14 Id.   
 15 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2, at 443 & n.94, 444.   
 16 See id. at 444 (observing that “[i]t takes many years for research to translate into 
inventions and patents” and that Bessen and Meurer’s analysis does not consider the value 
that R&D expenditures generate years later).   
 17 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, & Standard 
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 119–20 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2001).   
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going to original inventors or firms that conducted the R&D 
underlying the patents being asserted.  Schwartz and Kesan may be 
correct, but there could still be a fundamental problem with NPE 
patent assertion that would make both the assertion costs and the 
payments to original inventors or inventing firms a complete social 
waste.  If the patents being asserted never led, directly or indirectly, 
to the products and processes that are alleged to infringe the patents, 
then paying anything to the inventors or owners of those patents is a 
socially wasteful tax on the economy. 
Put differently, if inventors came up with patents for inventions 
that were never commercialized or disseminated, and if others 
subsequently invented and commercialized the patented products 
and processes, then the patents did nothing to foster innovation.  If 
this is the case, making payments to the patent owners is wasteful for 
society.  Evidence suggests that the vast majority of patents asserted by 
NPEs were never copied or known about by the alleged infringers.18  
If this is true, then whatever the total cost from NPE patent assertion 
of unworked patents, and however much of it goes to the original 
inventor or inventing firm, these payments are completely wasteful. 
If the patent system cannot distinguish between patents asserted 
wastefully by NPEs and other, non-problematic patents, then the 
social waste from NPE assertion is worth the cost—at least so long as 
the patent system on the whole encourages innovation.  Schwartz and 
Kesan take this attitude in their essay, cautioning against precipitous 
changes to patent law that might affect innovation incentives as well 
as wasteful patent assertions.19 
Bessen and Meurer, on the other hand, argue that the patent 
system on the whole fails to encourage innovation, at least outside of 
the pharmaceutical industry.20  In their essay, and in prior work, 
Bessen and Meurer posit that one of the primary solutions to patents 
serving as a drag on innovation (rather than as a boost) is to solve the 
patent notice problem.21 
 
 18 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG. 26, 32–33 
(2011).  As one example, Bessen and Meurer note that “RIM was forced to share the fruits 
of its success with NTP, a company that contributed nothing to [the success of] the 
BlackBerry,” and that “RIM was unaware of . . . [the] patent until after [it] had succeeded 
with [its] innovation.”  Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 420.   
 19 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2, at 439, 455–56.   
 20 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, & LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 4–5, 27 (2008). 
 21 See id. at 164; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 421.  The notice problem of patent 
claims occurs when one cannot determine the boundaries of the patent entitlement by 
reading the claims and specification of the patent.  This causes uncertainty as to the 
coverage of the patent and may lead to surprise when a patent is asserted against an 
invention that is very different from the primary embodiment in the patent but arguably 
falls under the uncertain boundaries of the claims.  See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 20, 
at 46, 62; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 393–94.   
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While the fuzziness of the scope of patent claims is undoubtedly 
a problem that results in much uncertainty and litigation, solving the 
notice problem cannot alone optimize efficiency in the patent system.  
Even if the boundaries of patents are very clear, when patents are 
granted for types of inventions that would be invented even without 
the patent incentive, allowing such patents to be asserted against 
other innovators who invent separately is a wasteful tax. 
It is important to note that the patent system could be more 
beneficial to society if, for inventions that are never adequately 
disseminated, the patents granted were not enforced.  As I have 
already noted, prior to the ascendance of NPE assertion, unworked 
patents were not very harmful.  They were asserted much less often 
and thus served as a tax on innovation much less often.  Part of the 
reason for this is that independent inventors often did not have the 
expertise or money to assert their patents.22  Another factor was that 
competitors often held these patents; asserting a patent for an 
invention in which the company was not making a product was often 
not worth the risk of countersuit.23  Thus, unused patents were often 
simply held in firms’ portfolios for defensive purposes.24  With the 
advent of NPEs, however, patents could be acquired by entities that 
had the expertise and funding to assert the patents but had no 
exposure to the risk of countersuits.25  This has allowed both 
independent inventors and firms participating in the market to sell 
or assign their patents to NPEs, thereby letting NPEs assert patents 
that formerly would not have been asserted. 
Bessen and Meurer point out that NPEs are often successful in 
asserting patents for at least nuisance value because so many patents 
have notice problems.26  While this is part of what makes NPE 
assertion costly to society, it also is simply a fact that many patents are 
granted that are never commercialized but are later enforced against 
surprised entities who have commercialized the claimed invention 
without ever knowing about the original invention and patent.27  
These unknown patents never show up in the market and are never 
copied by other independent inventors who subsequently put a 
product or process on the market that is covered by the claims of the 
unworked patent.  Thus, these patents do not act as spurs to 
successful, commercialized innovation.  Instead, if they are later 
 
 22 See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 210 (2006). 
 23 See Krueger, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 24 See Chien, supra note 5, at 11.   
 25 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 31; Krueger, supra note 6, at 4.   
 26 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 421, 423.   
 27 See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1805 (2003). 
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asserted, they act as taxes on those who do actually commercialize the 
innovation. 
The aforementioned notice problem is part of the reason that 
patents can be granted but remain unknown to others who will later 
invent and commercialize an invention arguably covered by the 
patent.28  The lack of clarity as to the boundaries of the patent claims 
can leave potential competitors completely unaware of their potential 
patent exposure.  But more problematically, numerous claims, 
especially process claims, are abstract enough that the language of 
the claims can read on other products or processes that seem 
completely unrelated.29  Thus, not only might a market participant 
miss finding a patent that could cover its inventions but the 
abstractness of many process patents is such that a firm would not 
realize that a given patent might be ruled to cover its product even if 
the firm read the patent from front to back.  One example among 
legion is the assertion of a patent on an improved ATM graphical 
user interface against Amazon.com’s 1-Click Internet ordering 
system.30  Reading the patent showed that the patent was clearly 
drawn to ATM graphical user interfaces.31  But the claim language 
was such that a plausible case could be made that Amazon’s Internet 
ordering system infringed.32 Amazon never knew about the patent 
before being sued.  Even had Amazon searched for patents that 
might cover the 1-Click system, it was unlikely to find this patent on a 
completely different type of system.  Moreover, had Amazon read the 
patent, it would not have helped Amazon with the work of coding the 
complex system that is the 1-Click ordering system. 
But it is unlikely that Amazon ever would have searched, because 
of a feature of patent law that makes it dangerous to do so.  The 
Patent Act allows the trebling of damages for patent infringement for 
willful infringement.33  The Federal Circuit has interpreted the 
willfulness provision in the statute to include activity undertaken with 
knowledge that making a product or process could infringe a 
patent.34  For this reason, many firms instruct their engineers and 
developers not to read patents, so that they can stay ignorant of 
patents in their field and avoid putting themselves in a position to be 
 
 28 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.   
 29 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 20, at 22–23.   
 30 IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516 (E.D. Va. 
2004). 
 31 Electronic Fund Transfer or Transaction System, U.S. Patent No. 6,149,055 (filed 
June 26, 1996) (issued Nov. 21, 2000).   
 32 See IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 33 See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 34 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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liable for enhanced damages for willfulness if a product or process is 
found to infringe.35 
The fact that firms in certain fields instruct their engineers and 
developers not to read patents tells us a couple of things.  First, firms 
must not think that there is enough to be learned by patents in their 
field to make reading them worth potential exposure to treble 
damages.  Second, the relevant players will never know many of these 
patents.  This means that what has been called the basic quid pro quo 
of the patent system—granting patents in exchange for disclosure of 
the invention36—is often not functioning in a meaningful way.  The 
system is set up so that even though unworked patents are freely 
available, many firms to whom they are potentially relevant 
affirmatively avoid reading them.  In the meantime, others who do 
search for patents when seeking freedom to operate may never find 
them because the boundaries of some patents are too uncertain.  In 
either of these cases, these patents are providing no help to society 
and instead are only functioning as a tax on innovation if they are 
later asserted against those who have independently commercialized 
the invention. 
If this is the case, it would be better never to grant patents of 
these types at all.  But how do we determine which types of 
innovation yield patents that are without benefit rather than patents 
that are useful as incentives?  An easy place to start is to look at 
industries where it is widely reported that firms instruct their 
engineers and developers not to read patents.  Common perception 
suggests this is generally true for high technology and software 
companies.37  Given that firms in these industries do not seem to use 
patents to help them innovate, it makes sense to call them 
independent inventors or innocent infringers.38  If there are a 
number of independent inventors who are being sued for patent 
infringement, then legislation proposed in Congress to exempt 
innocent infringers from liability might be the best solution to the 
problem of patents acting as a tax, whether NPEs or anyone else 
assert the patents.39 
There are two potential problems with an innocent infringer 
defense.  First, it can be difficult at times to tell whether someone 
innocently infringed or copied.  This same difficulty exists in 
 
 35 Lemley & Tangri, supra note 27, at 1100–01. 
 36 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 37 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 1–4.  
 38 It is not innocent infringement if a firm copies a product in the market without 
knowing that the product is patented.  There, the patent incentive does seem to have 
provided incentive for commercialization—commercialization that the firm subsequently 
copied.  
 39 See Michael J. McKeon, The Patent Marking and Notice Statute: A Question of “Fact” or 
“Act”?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 465 (1996). 
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copyright law, however, with regard to copyright law’s independent 
creation defense.  While independent creation defenses can at times 
be difficult on the facts, copyright law has developed a fairly robust 
way of dealing with this issue that courts administering a patent 
independent inventor defense can borrow.40 
Second, if the prospect of winning a race to patent an expensive 
new invention makes the difference between investing or not 
investing in the R&D needed to make the invention, then an 
independent inventor defense could deter or delay innovation.  For 
instance, if four teams of researchers at four pharmaceutical 
companies were all interested in pursuing a promising new possibility 
for cancer treatment, but the research was expensive enough that 
each team did not want to engage in the research without the 
possibility of getting exclusive rights, then allowing an independent 
inventor defense could destroy any exclusive rights from the patent 
because each team would have the right to produce the cancer-
fighting drug so long as they did all of the research on their own.  
Thus, the ability to win an invention race and lock out competitors 
for twenty years would be diminished or destroyed in some situations, 
and that could deter some innovation.41  Nevertheless, if the 
magnitude of the cost to society from the assertion of unworked, 
undisseminated patents is anywhere near what Bessen and Meurer 
determine—and there is good reason to think that it is—the cost of 
the patent tax being collected by NPEs and others may be great 
enough that some loss of invention incentive from an independent 
inventor defense may be more than outweighed. 
An alternative reform to try to decrease the cost of NPEs and 
others’ assertions of undisseminated patents is to eliminate 
patentability in areas of innovation where they are, on net, more 
costly than beneficial.  I have already discussed that it is widely 
reported that many developers and engineers in high technology, 
software, and business methods do not read patents and, in fact, 
affirmatively avoid them.42  This strongly suggests that patents in these 
areas are not serving the function of disseminating information about 
 
 40 See id. at 434–36, 466.   
 41 In other scenarios, however, an independent invention defense might not deter 
innovation at all.  Patent races result in a lot of economic waste because the losers of the 
patent races cannot get any return from their invention or near invention (other than 
potential gains in knowledge or research skills that may be applicable to other problems).  
If each independent inventor could commercialize its invention, then the R&D of those 
who lost the race would not be wasted.  This could result in more incentives for 
innovation instead of less.  Even though the reward for invention would be lower (though 
independent inventors would likely engage in oligopoly pricing to the extent needed to 
make up for R&D costs), the risk would also be much lower since there would only be a 
complete loss of R&D expenditures if the team failed to invent anything rather than 
simply if the team failed to invent first. 
 42 Lemley & Tangri, supra note 34, at 1100–01.   
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invention in these fields.  Moreover, because each assertion of an 
unworked and undisseminated patent is, by definition, an assertion 
against an entity that independently invented the product or process 
at issue, those assertions serve only as a tax on secondary, 
independent inventors, and do not benefit society. 
It would save society even more cost if, instead of simply allowing 
an independent inventor defense (which will involve discovery and 
thus will still be costly to prove in court), we could eliminate broad 
swaths of patents that are much more likely to be asserted as taxes on 
innovation than to serve the purpose of encouraging needed 
innovation.  As previously discussed, one way to do this would be to 
identify areas of innovation that do not appear to benefit from the 
patent grant, and eliminate patents for those subject matter.43  Given 
that firms do not seem to read patents in software, high tech, and 
business methods, these fields are likely places to start for an analysis 
of whether patents are needed at all in these areas. 
In addition to critiquing Bessen and Meurer’s study, Schwartz 
and Kesan go on to suggest further avenues for empirical work to 
shed light on whether there really is a problem with NPE litigation 
and, if so, to what extent.44  Bessen and Meurer agree that further 
study is merited, but they believe that the evidence to date is 
compelling enough to support patent reform to alleviate problems 
with a failure of the patent system in regard to NPE litigation.  
Schwartz and Kesan believe that the evidence is not yet strong 
enough to merit changes in the patent system. 
I too have suggestions for future empirical work that would assist 
patent policymakers based on the issues I have discussed above.  
Research designed to study the question of whether patents could be 
beneficially eliminated in some areas of innovation would be of great 
value to patent policymakers.  Researchers could study the incidence 
of copying in various areas of innovation.  They could look for both 
intentional copying as well as copying without any knowledge of the 
patent on the part of the copyist.  Only truly independent invention 
should be considered not to be copying.  Copying a market trend 
without knowing that the trend is the result of patented innovation 
should still count as copying the patent for the purposes of 
determining whether the patent drove innovation. 
Researchers could also look for data as to the average and 
median R&D costs in different areas of innovation.  The lower the 
 
 43 This is a way to improve the patent system that I have written about before.  See 
David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting 
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 195 (2009) (arguing that patents should 
only be granted for subject matter for which the benefit of the patent grant outweighs the 
cost of the patent grant’s monopoly deadweight loss and transaction costs). 
 44 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2, at 428–33.   
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R&D costs, the less likely these areas need patents.  Likewise, 
researchers could look for data regarding the mean and median costs 
of copying an invention in various areas of innovation.  If the costs of 
copying are very high,45 then there is less need for patent protection.  
If the costs of copying are very low,46 patents may be needed to 
prevent appropriation of the value of invention without bearing any 
of the costs.  Of course, the cost of copying must be considered in 
light of the costs of initial invention.  If initial invention costs were 
negligible, then even scant copying costs may be enough to prevent 
free rider problems that will deter innovation. 
Researchers could also look for data as to the frequency with 
which patents are used to protect inventions in different areas of 
innovation.  Researchers could also do the sort of analysis that Bessen 
and Meurer do in their essay but break down the analysis by type of 
innovation.  If the evidence indicates that patents cost more than they 
benefit a particular area of innovation, then eliminating patents for 
these subject matters would make society better off and reduce some 
of the costs of the patent system.  Empirical work designed to study 
line-drawing problems between areas of innovation that do not need 
the patent grant and areas that would be very helpful to patent 
policymakers.  For instance, study could be made of the difficulty in 
distinguishing software patents from other types of process patents.47 
 
 45 Copying costs may be high for inventions where the patent enables invention but 
there is still a lot of work to do to reduce the invention to practice.  For example, many 
software patents are described in flowchart form at a very high level of generality.  A 
competitor could copy the method laid out in the software patent but would still have to 
hire a team of software developers, test the program, debug the program, and then 
advertise and get name recognition to sell the program and compete. 
 46 Sometimes the costs of copying are low, especially compared to the costs of 
invention.  In the pharmaceutical field, for instance, the costs of R&D and testing a drug 
can be enormous, whereas the chemical knowledge and facilities needed to copy a drug 
once the molecule has been disclosed in an enabling patent specification is very low. 
 47 Some work has already been done along these lines, but it is far from conclusive.  
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter,  On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality 
One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 765 
(2006) (“All attempts by courts and Congress to arrive at a workable definition for 
business methods have encountered intractable difficulties.”); John R. Allison & Ronald J. 
Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 334 (2007); Jay 
Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 870–71 (2003); Ricardo Bonilla, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the 
Worthiness of Business Method Patents After Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1285, 
1295–98 (2011); Brian H. Lawrence, Clarifying Patent Law’s Role in Financial Service: Time to 
Settle the “Bill”ski?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 319, 345 (2012) (arguing that Signature’s “Hub and 
Spoke” method in State Street was considered a software patent at the time––despite 
intuitively also appearing to be a financial services patent––and that while this uncertainty 
poses labeling problems, the reality is that many patents overlap different industries).  It 
should be kept in mind that while it may be difficult to distinguish between business 
methods and software processes, so long as these two types of processes can be 
distinguished from other processes reasonably well, eliminating patents on business 
methods and software could be socially beneficial if it is found that the costs of patents in 
these areas exceed their benefits. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bessen and Meurer have made an important contribution to the 
study of patent assertion by NPEs in their essay.  Schwartz and Kesan 
also have made an important contribution to the discussion by 
analyzing critically the study and conclusions of Bessen and Meurer.  
Schwartz and Kesan are certainly correct that it would be ideal if the 
data underlying the study could be fully examined and shared.  
Unfortunately, publicly available data on patent licensing and 
defenses against patent assertions are scarce. 
Patent assertions by NPEs are changing the landscape of the 
patent system and are imposing significant economic costs.  Studying 
these costs is very worthwhile.  NPE patent assertions also point out 
flaws and faults in the patent system that were not costly enough to 
address before the rapid rise of NPE patent assertion.  Notice 
problems, overbreadth, multiple invention, and needless patent 
grants mattered much less when patents were held more defensively 
than they are now.  Thus, in some ways, patent assertions by NPEs do 
not raise unique problems that need to be solved in the patent system 
so much as they increase the severity of pre-existing problems.  The 
independent invention defense may be a solution to part of those 
problems.  Disallowing patents for certain subject matters of 
invention might be another part of the solution.  I have suggested 
future empirical inquiries that could be done to help shed light on 
the effectiveness of these proposed solutions. 
Because of the ever-changing nature of innovation and the 
economy, we will never have all of the empirical evidence needed 
before making patent law reforms.  We will, to some extent, always 
have to rely on assumptions and intuitions in making patent law.  But 
to the extent high quality empirical analyses can be conducted such 
as those conducted in the essays by Bessen and Meurer and Schwartz 
and Kesan, they are very helpful for informing our assumptions and 
intuitions and thus very helpful for the important task of adapting 
and reforming patent law.  
